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The Notion of a “pre-emptive War:”
the Six Day War Revisited 
Ersun N. Kurtulus
The article presents a critical assessment of the widespread conceptualization of 
the June 1967 War between Israel and its neighboring Arab states as a pre-emp-
tive war both in academic and non-academic writing. Tracing the origins of the 
notion of pre-emptive war to international law, the article identifies three neces-
sary conditions for such a war to be classified as pre-emptive: acute crisis com-
bined with high alert levels; vulnerable offensive weapons; and strategic parity 
as regards to offensive capabilities. On the basis of a re-interpretation of the evi-
dence produced by previous research, this article argues that the circumstances 
surrounding the Six Day War did not fulfill some of these necessary conditions. 
This conclusion also is supported by evidence related to the Israeli decision to 
launch a first strike.
The June 1967 War1 is not only a turning point in the contemporary history of the 
Middle East, but also a milestone in a conceptual development: namely, the gradual 
broadening of the concept of “pre-emptive war” that culminated in the use of this term 
to depict the war conducted by the United States and its allies in Iraq, and later to refer 
to a possible attack, at the time of writing, on the nuclear facilities of Iran. 
On June 5, 1967, after three weeks of tension, the Israeli Air Force attacked air 
bases in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and destroyed approximately 80% of the warplanes 
of these states on the ground. During the military operations that followed the initial 
strike, Israeli troops swiftly occupied the Sinai peninsula, the gaza Strip, the West 
Bank of Jordan, and the golan Heights. In what was probably one of the first employ-
ments of this concept to describe a conventional war, the Israeli attack was regarded 
as a pre-emptive strike, first in the minutes of the Israeli government,2 and later by the 
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1. While Israeli and most of the Western sources refer to this war as “the Six Day War,” Arab sourc-                   
es prefer to use the expression “the June 1967 War“ (Cf. Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 
and the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: penguin Books, 2002), p. xiii). In an attempt to 
avoid bias introduced by word choice, I will alternate between these expressions in this article.
2. The official Israeli government decision concerning the strike was drafted by Defense Minister              
Moshe Dayan and gave the outlines of pre-emption: “After hearing reports on the military and diplo-
matic situation from the prime minister, the defense minister, the chief of staff and the head of IDF
[Continued on next page]
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general public. This view is now rather well established and, as a general concep-
tualization of this war, it has been presented in various contexts: books on weapon 
systems;4 textbooks on international law;5 scholarly study of surprise attacks;6 mono-
graphs of political philosophers;7 quantitative research on war;8 reference books;9 and 
even travel guides.10 Leaving aside issues emanating from the normative justification 
and the defensive connotations embedded in the notion of a pre-emptive war, such a 
conceptualization of the Six Day War raises two important questions:
• What is a pre-emptive war and on what basis or criteria can it be differentiated 
from other types of first strikes, such as surprise attack, preventive strike, or unin-
tentional war? 
• To the extent that it is possible to identify a set of criteria that would enable iden-
tification of pre-emptive strikes, to what extent do the circumstances surrounding 
[Continued from previous page] 
intelligence, the government has determined that the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan are deployed 
for a multi-front attack that threatens Israel’s existence. It is therefore decided to launch a military 
strike aimed at liberating Israel from encirclement and preventing assault by the United Arab Com-
mand.” (quoted in Oren, Six Days of War, p. 158).
. Another version of this argument is the view put forward by Roland popp in a recent article                  
that the conceptualization of the 1967 War as an “inadvertent war” (i.e. an unwanted war which is the 
outcome of miscalculations, misperceptions, and misunderstandings) is adopted by many scholars 
writing on the June 1967 War and that this is a “recurring theme in both revisionist and traditionalist 
accounts of  Six Day War.” (Roland popp, “Stumbling Decidedly into the Six Day War,” The Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 282-.) As shall be seen in due course, the differences 
here are to a large extent terminological. Scholars writing on the nuclear strategic thinking of the Cold 
War era tend to regard pre-emptive war either as a sub-species of inadvertent war or they treat both 
terms as synonyms.
4. See for instance, Anthony M. Thornborough,       Iron Hand: Smashing the Enemy’s Air Defences 
(Sparkford: Haynes publications, 2002), p. 1; Stewart Wilson, Phantom (Australia: Sovereign Se-
ries, Motorbooks International, 2002), p. 76 and Stewart Wilson, Combat Aircraft Since 1945 (Fysh-
wick: Aerospace publications pty Ltd, 2000), p. 11. 
5. See for instance Yoram Dinstein,      War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University press, 2001), p.172-. Dinstein makes a distinction between “interceptive” and “anticipa-
tory self defence” which roughly corresponds to that between pre-emptive and preventive attack.
6. See for instance Michael Handel, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” in Klaus               
Knorr and patrick Morgan, eds., Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 198), pp. 111 and 11. Handel more often uses the term “unan-
ticipated wars” to refer to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. See also Klaus Knorr, “Strategic Surprise: The 
Incentive Structure,” in Knorr and Morgan, eds., Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Oppor-
tunities, p. 187.
7. For a detailed account see Michael Walzer,        Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With His-
torical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 80-85. Treating the Six Day War under the 
heading “pre-emptive Strikes,” Walzer uses the term “anticipation“ to refer to the Israeli first strike.
8. See for instance, Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam,          Democracies at War (princeton: princeton 
University press, 2002), p. 150, see also pp. 87 and 29 n0.
9. See for instance    The New Encyclopædia Britannica, Macropædia – Knowledge in Depth, 15th 
edition (1992), p. 144.
10. Berlitz Israel Pocket Guide (princeton and London: Berlitz publishing Co., Inc., 1988), p. 6; 
Footprint Jordan Handbook: The Travel Guide, 1st edition (Bath: Footprint Handbooks Ltd., 2000), 
p. 50.
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the Six Day War fulfill these criteria?
On the face of it, certain factors could be pointed out to support the view that the 
June 1967 War was a pre-emptive war. Deployment of some 80,000 Egyptian troops 
on the Sinai peninsula,11 agitation of the Arab opinion with calls for the destruction 
of Israel, the ensuing fear and alarm among the Israeli public,12 and perhaps most im-
portantly, conclusion of a defense treaty that comprised all of Israel’s neighbors with 
the exception of Lebanon just before the war, easily could give the impression of an 
imminent attack by the Arab states and thus open up the way for the interpretation of 
the Israeli first strike as a pre-emption of that attack. However, in-depth analysis of the 
circumstances surrounding the Israeli strike produces a different and more complicated 
picture. In what follows I shall first map out the difficulties involved in the concept of 
pre-emptive war and, by means of logical deduction, develop a set of criteria on the 
basis of the use of this concept in the nuclear strategic thinking of the Cold War period. 
This will be followed by an evaluation with reference to these criteria of the evidence 
produced by previous research about the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the 
Six Day War. This evaluation will be complemented with a brief review of additional 
evidence that may be raised against the notion of the June 1967 War as a pre-emptive 
war. The article will be concluded with general observations about the broadening of 
the concept of “pre-emptive war.”
DEFINITIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF “PRE-EMPTIvE WAR”
The origins of the concept of “pre-emptive war” may be traced back to the so-
called Caroline case, a border incident between the USA and Canada in 187 and the 
ensuing developments. In a note to the British government, whose troops had infringed 
upon the territory of the United States, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster formu-
lated what is now accepted as the “locus classicus of the right of self-defense” and 
required Britain to show a “necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving 
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”1 There is a clear connection 
here between the right of self-defense and pre-emption and, according to Walzer, this 
view — “the legalist paradigm“ in his words — “would permit us to do little more than 
respond to an attack once we had seen it coming but before we had felt its impact.” In 
this view, pre-emption “is like a reflex action, a throwing up of one’s arms to the very 
11. According to recently declassified CIA documents this figure was 50,000 Egyptian troops             
together with 71 aircraft and 500 tanks near the Israeli border (see popp, “Stumbling Decidedly into 
the Six Day War,” p. 00).
12. In the words of Maxime Rodinson, “�t�he propaganda war seemed to show that war was inevi-                
table.” Maxime Rodinson, Israel and the Arabs (Harmondsworth: penguin Books, 1982), p. 182; see 
also pp. 175-184. See also Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (London: Oxford 
University press, 1975), pp. 410-412; Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge: Belknap 
press, 1978), p. 97. Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 97, 15-16, 147-148. It has to be noted that there is 
no evidence to suggest that the state of public opinion had any effect on the Israeli or the Arab deci-
sion-making about starting armed operations.
1. Webster quoted in D.W. Bowett,      Self-Defense in International Law (New York: Frederick A. 
praeger, 1958), p. 59.
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last minute.”14
This narrow and strictly defensive conceptualization of a pre-emptive strike is 
reflected in those definitions given to the concept in the nuclear strategic thinking of 
the Cold War era, where avoidance of a pre-emptive strike by one of the superpowers 
was one of the highest priorities. For instance, Williams and Williams describe “pre-
emptive attack” as “an attack provoked by an imminent and certain attack.”15 Betts 
maintains that there are three types of first strike: “preemptive;” “aggressive;” and “pre-
ventive;” and “�a� preemptive attack is one made in immediate anticipation of enemy 
attack.”16 Schelling and Halperin define pre-emptive war as a “�w�ar initiated in the 
expectation that attack is imminent.”17 According to Freedman, to give a last example, 
a pre-emptive war was “tied to a specific situation ... when there were strong grounds 
for believing that a Soviet strike was imminent.”18
Three observations may be made about these and similar descriptions of pre-
emptive war. First, regarded as definitions of the concept they are rather imprecise, 
always non-operationalized and sometimes confusing. As has been pointed out by Frei, 
terms such as “accidental war,” “inadvertent war,” “unintentional war,” “war by mis-
calculation or misunderstanding,” “unpremeditated war,” and “pre-emptive war” seem 
to be “somehow interrelated, partly identical (synonymous), partly overlapping.”19 This 
is probably the consequence of the fact that these concepts are not operationalized, in 
a manner that would enable us to differentiate a pre-emptive strike from other types of 
first strikes. Sometimes, this imprecision leads to a terminological confusion reflected 
in expressions such as “pre-emptive surprise attack”20 or “attacking pre-emptively and 
doing so by surprise”21 which raises the question how a pre-emptive attack, which per 
definition emanates from a mutually expected attack — an expectation that is often 
caused by and reflected in alert, warning, or outright crisis — can take the prospective 
attacker by surprise at a strategic level.
Second, the definitions are the product of nuclear strategic thinking and the fact 
that we — fortunately — did not experience a nuclear war during the Cold War rivalry 
puts a limit to their empirical utility. This is because the definitions reflect the rela-
tive simplicity of the nuclear context, which was characterized by overkill capabilities, 
clearly perceived weapon-vulnerabilities, and an approximate parity in the strategic 
balance. As shall be seen in due course, once we shift the focus of attention from 
nuclear strategic thinking to conventional warfare, such factors become much more 
complicated and show the limits of the utility of these definitions.
Third, the definitions are based on decision-making and this causes a range of 
14. Walzer,  Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 74-75.
15. geoffrey Lee Williams and Alan Lee Williams,        Crisis in European Defence: The Next Ten 
Years (London: Charles Knight & Co Ltd, 1974), p. 19.
16. Richard K. Betts,    Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 1987), p. 161.
17. Schelling and Halperin quoted in Daniel Frei,        Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War (London: 
Croom Helm, 198), p. .
18. Lawrence Freedman,   The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Hampshire: MacMillan press Ltd., 
1989), p. 126.
19. Frei,  Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War, pp. -4.
20. Handel, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” p. 12.          
21. Knorr, “Strategic Surprise: The Incentive Structure,”       p. 187.
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methodological difficulties. Some of the elements involved in decision-making are 
either non-verifiable or immeasurable: We can neither corroborate that a war is “im-
minent and certain” nor measure the desperation caused among the decision-makers 
by this situation. Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to presume that any decision to 
launch a first strike (regardless of whether it is pre-emptive or not) will be taken by 
an inner circle of decision-makers, who deal with issues related to high politics and 
who are placed far up in the political hierarchy. Such circles are not only notoriously 
inaccessible for researchers who would like to study the decision about a first strike, 
but also immune to infiltration by the intelligence services of the adversary whose task 
would be to report about the decision and, hence the “imminent attack.” To complicate 
the matter further, there is also an incentive on the part of the decision-makers to resort 
to deception and exploit the defensive connotations of pre-emptive strike in order to 
legitimize what may after all be an aggressive surprise attack. These factors restrict the 
possibility of conducting empirical research on pre-emptive strikes on the basis of the 
decision-making process.
Consequently, it will be argued here that there are compelling reasons to shift the 
focus of attention from decision-making as such (the sufficient condition for a pre-emp-
tive strike under certain circumstances, such as correct assessment of the military situa-
tion) to material factors that lie outside of the sphere of decision-making (the necessary 
conditions). It is possible to clarify the logic behind this approach in two ways. First, 
pre-emption of an imminent attack is a reaction to material circumstances. Just like any 
other foreign policy or defense decision, a decision to launch a pre-emptive strike may 
be regarded as a reaction to those factors that constitute the environment of the deci-
sion-makers. In other words, certain conditions that emanate from what Brecher calls 
“the external operative environment” function as “inputs” for decision-making.22 It is 
possible to presume that in the case of a decision to strike pre-emptively, these condi-
tions should give rationality to, or constitute the basis for, such a decision. If not, then 
the strike in question is, in the least aggressive case, an erroneous decision that starts 
“an unintentional war.” In such a situation, the inputs of the decision may be traced 
back to the “internal operative environment” or the “psychological environment.”2 
Second, and more importantly, pre-emption of an imminent attack is the outcome of a 
conjunction between decision-making and material circumstances. It is not possible to 
identify a pre-emptive strike only on the basis of decision-making, because this would 
blur the crucial distinction between a pre-emptive war, which is launched in order to 
neutralize a forthcoming attack, and an unintentional war, which is caused by an incor-
rect perception on the part of decision-makers that there is such an imminent attack. 
The difference between these two types of wars is by no means purely terminological: 
For instance, good quality intelligence may precipitate a pre-emptive war while be-
ing a decisive factor in avoiding an unintentional war. Furthermore, concentration on 
decision-making is also problematic due to the methodological difficulties mentioned 
above and because of the incentive on the part of decision-makers to resort to deception 
by exploiting the defensive connotations of the word “pre-emptive war.” Seen in this 
vein, an exclusive focus on decision-making also risks blurring the crucial difference 
22. Brecher,  Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, pp. 6-7.
2. Brecher,  Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, pp. 6-7.
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between a pre-emptive strike and a classical surprise attack of the pearl Harbor type. 
THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR A PRE-EMPTIvE WAR: 
A CONCEPTUAL ExPLICATION
At the most basic level, a pre-emptive war logically presupposes the mutual ca-
pacity to launch an attack, and a kind of parity with respect to offensive capabilities, 
where the impending attack of one side is neutralized by the actual attack of the other. 
Such mutual capacity requires, in turn, possession of offensive weapons by both sides 
that would enable them to carry out an attack — imminent or pre-emptive — rapidly 
and effectively. Furthermore, it is not possible to speak about imminence of an attack 
if no preparations are undertaken to launch such an attack. The most important indica-
tor of such preparations is high alert or mobilization levels among the armed forces of 
the state that is about to attack. Such preparations will seldom go undetected and, by 
providing advance notice of the impending attack, they will cause increased levels of 
tension and crisis between the states involved in the conflict. Finally, the pre-emptive 
nature of the strike requires that it be directed towards eliminating the capacity of the 
adversary to launch an attack. This capacity can only be eliminated by the destruction 
of the offensive weapons of that adversary, which, in turn, requires that these weapons 
be vulnerable to such destruction. 
Thus, when a state, A, attacks another state, B, three conditions have to material-
ize before we can regard the attack as pre-emptive:
(a) that there is an acute crisis between A and B, and the armed forces of both states 
should be put on high alert.
(b) that A and B possess offensive weapons, which are vulnerable.
(c) and that there is at least a rough strategic parity between them as regards to of-
fensive capabilities.
Naturally, these factors are not isolated from each other. For instance, offensive 
weapons would be devoid of any immediate impact if they were not put on high alert 
and positioned for possible use. Similarly, as the case of the Cuban missile crisis shows, 
the mere presence of offensive weapons or their whereabouts may cause a crisis be-
tween two states. Thus, the distinction between these three factors is made only for 
analytical purposes.
To start with the first criterion, we can reasonably presume that there is a direct 
connection between acute crisis and high alert: A crisis between two states may prompt 
them to raise the alert levels of their armed forces. In a similar vein, if a state raises the 
alert levels of its forces, this may lead to a crisis between the state in question and its 
adversary. Moreover, if the emergence of an acute crisis and high alert levels coincide 
with other factors mentioned above (strategic parity and possession of offensive weap-
ons that are vulnerable), then this may raise the question as to who will strike first and 
cause desperation among decision-makers of both states. This relationship has been 
pointed out in previous studies on pre-emptive strikes. For instance, Frei considers “a 
catalytic cause such as an acute international crisis confrontation” together with “pre-
disposition of the strategic system of deterrence system” as the necessary conditions of 
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an “unintentional nuclear war.”24 During the Cold War, a group of researchers from Har-
vard University maintained that “in a deep and apparently irresolvable crisis” one of the 
superpowers may launch its nuclear weapons. One of the reasons that may increase the 
probability of such a pre-emptive strike is the perception of the decision-makers that 
the other superpower is planing to strike “first, and soon.” This, in turn, requires “the 
adversary’s forces be at or moving toward (or perceived to be at) a high state of alert.”25 
The relationship between high levels of alert and pre-emptive war is even clearer in a 
diagram used by Handel in his case studies of the three Arab-Israeli wars.
As may be deduced from the diagram, the surprise effect is always relative. For 
instance, according to Handel, the Israelis were somewhere in the middle of the spec-
trum (partial surprise) in 197 while the attacks on pearl Harbor and Operation Bar-
barossa found the United States and Soviet Union respectively in a condition of total 
surprise. The most important element for the purposes of the argument here is the con-
nection that he makes between “full alert” and “pre-emption.”26
To shift to the second criterion, the relationship between the vulnerability of 
weapons and a pre-emptive first strike is a well researched topic in the literature on nu-
clear weapons and nuclear strategy. According to Frei, “the urgency with which the de-
cision must be made” is dependent on “the vulnerability of both the strategic weapons 
and the communication and command channels.”27 This relationship is also reflected in 
the logic of “use them or lose them,” which informed one of the nuclear strategic goals 
of the United States during the Cold War, the goal of “crisis stability.” The aim here 
was to reduce the probability of a pre-emptive war by diminishing the vulnerability 
of the nuclear weapon systems. On the other hand, however, the connection between 
offensive weapons and pre-emptive war is not sufficiently emphasized in this body of 
literature. The reason for this may well be the fact that all nuclear weapon systems, with 
the exception of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems, were offensive weapons during 
24. Frei,  Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War, p. 5. The difference between “unintentional war” 
and “pre-emptive war” is only terminological.
25. Albert Carnesale, et al.,     Living With Nuclear Weapons: The Harvard Nuclear Study Group 
(Cambridge: Harvard University press, 198), p. 55.
26. Handel, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” p. 145.          
27. Italics are in the original. Frei,       Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War, p. 5. See also Carnesale et 
al., Living With Nuclear Weapons, pp. 142-14.
Source: Handel, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” p. 145.
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the Cold War, and this may have pushed to the background the study of the impact that 
offensive weapons may have on the probability of a pre-emptive war. Nevertheless, 
some preliminary answer to this question may be deduced from Quester’s study of the 
impact of offensive and defensive technology on peace and stability. posing the ques-
tion as to whether the technology gives incentives for caution or pre-emption, Quester 
argues that
with a basically defensive technology, perhaps a three to one, or five to one, superi-
ority will be required to break through; with a more offensive technology, far less a 
superiority may suffice, or no numerical superiority at all may be required, as either 
side can win if it only beats the other to the offensive. The last situation is the most 
horrendous for peace, because it creates the kinds of mutually reinforcing fears that 
leave little stability for the prevention of war.28
To this it may be added that in the conventional context the offensive weapons may take 
various forms: ballistic missiles with conventional warheads, attack and fighter planes, 
suicide bombers about to leave their base camps, or any other functionally equivalent 
delivery systems. Equally importantly in the conventional context is the vulnerability 
of counter-value targets, such as population centers and civilians, especially if non-
state actors are involved in the conflict.
With regard to the third criterion, it is possible to claim that the connection be-
tween strategic parity and pre-emptive strike is a trivial one: At a minimum level of 
rationality, mutual fears of a first strike require a mutual capacity to launch such a first 
strike. It is more or less self-evident that, everything being equal, we could not speak of 
a pre-emptive war between, for example, the USA and the island of grenada or Russia 
and the Baltic states.29 However, in many cases the balance of power is far from being 
as asymmetric as it is between these states and, as it is indicated by the long and often 
fruitless disarmament negotiations conducted within the framework of Mutual Bal-
anced Force Reductions (MBFR), and then, Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) dur-
ing the Cold War, it is much more difficult to speak about the existence or lack thereof 
of strategic parity in the context of conventional weapon systems. 
There are two complications involved here. First, conventional weapons lack the 
enormous destructive power of the nuclear weapons. In those cases where it has been 
possible to speak about a general strategic parity, such as the balance between the USA 
and the Soviet Union, this has been due to the possession by these states of nuclear 
weapons with “over-kill” capacities. In such a context, possession of a hundred more 
or a hundred less nuclear warheads or delivery systems would not have a significant 
impact on the nuclear power balance. In contrast, in a conventional strategic context, 
possession of a hundred more fighter jets or a hundred less tanks may shift the military 
28. g. H. Quester,    Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1977), p. 212.
29. Even in the current case of the war between the United States and Iraq, the former repeatedly                  
made claims — yet to be validated at the time of writing — to the effect that the latter possessed 
weapons of mass destruction and that this justified launching a pre-emptive war. To the extent that it 
implies the possibility of launching an attack (pre-emptive or not) on the part of Iraq, these claims are 
tantamount to a proposition — alleged, perceived, or real — that there is a strategic parity between 
the parts to the conflict, despite the apparent asymmetry in their power.
228 M miDDLe eaSt JoUrnaL
balance in either direction, and hence become a crucial factor determining the emer-
gence or disappearance of strategic parity. Secondly, the geopolitical circumstances 
may have an important influence on the military balance. For instance, the question 
may be raised — as it has been done in the context of Israeli-Arab military balance 
prior to 1967 — as to how many surplus conventional weapons a state may need in 
order to compensate for a disadvantageous military-geographical position.
In conclusion, a pre-emptive strike may be defined as a strike launched in the 
anticipation of an imminent attack, but under the necessary conditions that: 
(a) there is a deep international crisis which puts the military apparatus of both parts 
to the conflict on high alert; 
(b) there is at least a rough strategic parity between them and; 
(c) both parts possess offensive weapons which are vulnerable.
This criteria differentiates a pre-emptive strike from other types of similar strikes, 
among them, accidental war, unintentional war, surprise attack, and preventive war. 
However, it is necessary to make two observations about this definition before moving 
on to the empirical study of the June 1967 War. First, since these criteria are necessary 
conditions for a pre-emptive strike, what we have here is a negative definition of the 
concept: If such conditions are absent, then, it is not possible to regard the strike under 
consideration as a pre-emptive first strike. In other words, the criteria clarify in which 
cases we cannot speak about the existence of a pre-emptive war. Secondly, the search 
for empirical material related to the sufficient condition, the decision to launch a pre-
emptive attack, continues to constitute an important research agenda. This is due to the 
fact that where the necessary conditions of a pre-emptive first strike are existent this 
does not lead automatically to the conclusion that the strike in question is a pre-emp-
tive strike. The decision-makers may mistakenly or deliberately exaggerate — or even 
invent — the possibility of an imminent attack. In the latter case, we would speak of a 
classical case of a surprise attack, while in the former we would be witnessing a tragic 
instance of an unintentional war. 
THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR A PRE-EMPTIvE WAR AND 
THE JUNE 1967 WAR
An evaluation of the circumstances preceding the Six Day War on the basis of 
the criteria for a pre-emptive strike formulated in the previous section reveals that the 
Israeli first strike on June 5, 1967 did not fulfill completely these criteria. In a nutshell 
the argument is as follows: It is true that there was a rough strategic parity between 
Israel and the Arab states since the mid-1960s, where the qualitative superiority of the 
former compensated for the quantitative superiority of the latter and that both parties 
to the conflict possessed offensive weapons, in the form of fighter and attack planes, 
which were on high alert before the war. However, the three week-long crisis that pre-
ceded the war was not acute towards its later phases and the Israeli offensive weapons 
(fighters and ground attack aircraft) were not vulnerable to an eventual attack that could 
have been launched by the neighboring Arab states. These factors may now be studied 
in some detail.
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Acute InternAtIonAl crIsIs And HIgH Alert
The chain of events that led to the June 1967 War is well documented in the avail-
able literature and the chronological details of the crisis do not need to concern us here. 
What is of paramount importance, however, is the possibility of dividing this period of 
three weeks into two phases with the Israeli cabinet decision on May 2 to postpone 
military action and to send Foreign Minister Abba Eban to the United States, United 
Kingdom, and France on a diplomatic mission as the turning point. The first phase was 
characterized by acute international crisis, instability, and high alert, while during the 
second phase the crisis was not pressing anymore and, due to circumstances which 
will be addressed in a moment, the military and political instability was contained to a 
considerable degree.
The crisis started with a sudden escalation sparked by Soviet intelligence re-
ports about an imminent Israeli attack on Syria. This information reached the Egyptian 
president gamal ‘Abdel Nasser �Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir� sometime between May 9 and 
1. Egypt reacted to this by requesting the removal of the United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEF) from the Sinai peninsula and the gaza Strip on May 16, deploying up to 
50,000-80,000 troops in the Sinai within a week and finally closing the Strait of Tiran 
to both Israeli-flagged ships and the passage of all strategic material on May 22. The 
Israeli response took the form of a government decision on partial mobilization on May 
16 and total mobilization on May 19. Less than a week after the start of the crisis the 
situation had become very explosive: According to one scholar, the Israeli decision-
makers speculated about a possible Egyptian surprise attack on the Dimona nuclear 
reactor.0
However, it is possible to argue that four sets of factors had a mitigating impact 
on the crisis and a degree of stability was acquired during the last week of May, and 
that this situation continued until the start of military operations on June 5. First, after 
the above-mentioned decision of the Israeli government to postpone military action, 
which is interpreted in this article as the turning point of the crisis, the way was open 
to diplomatic initiatives. US president Lyndon Johnson put forward the Regatta plan 
(Operation Red Sea Regatta), which “called for a declaration of maritime nations as-
serting the right of free passage through the Straits,” which, if rejected by Egypt, would 
be followed by an attempt to break the blockade by “an international convoy of freight-
ers” protected by American and British warships.1 In turn, France suggested convening 
a four-power summit bringing together American, Soviet, British, and French leaders 
to solve the issue of the Strait. The UN Secretary general, U Thant, proposed a mora-
torium, freezing the situation for two or three weeks, whereby the Egyptians would not 
impose the blockade and the Israelis would not attempt to traverse the Strait. The last 
diplomatic initiative was a planned visit to Washington by Egyptian Vice president Za-
kkariya Muhieddin on June 7. This visit, coinciding as it did with the commencement 
of hostilities, never materialized. Although these proposals received limited support 
from the international community, and therefore may be regarded as unsuccessful, it is 
0. See Oren,   Six Days of War, pp. 158 and 75-76. For a critical evaluation of this claim see popp, 
“Stumbling Decidedly into the Six Day War,” pp. 295-8.
1. Oren,  Six Days of War, p. 105.
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possible to presume that they nonetheless alleviated the immediate crisis.
Secondly, the military escalation lost its momentum and neither Israel nor Egypt 
took any further action that could restart the escalation. By the time of the outbreak of 
hostilities the number of Egyptian troops in Sinai was 80,000-90,000 according to some 
sources,2 and 50,000 according to recently declassified American documents. Which-
ever figure is accepted, this indicates that the Egyptian troop movements had practi-
cally come to an end during the first phase of the crisis. Moreover, although “Egypt’s 
most effective striking force,”4 the Fourth Armoured Division, was moved into the 
Sinai peninsula, it was deployed in defensive positions west of the Mitla and gidi 
passes.5 It is true that both Jordan and Iraq joined the Joint Defense Treaty between 
Syria and Egypt just before the Israeli strike and Egyptian commandos were reported to 
have taken positions in Jordan. However, everything being equal — that is, speaking in 
objective terms in the sense of not taking into account how it may have been perceived 
by the Israeli decision-makers — this treaty should not have had any significant impact 
on the crisis for three reasons. In the first place, the Treaty was clearly a defense treaty: 
In its original form as the Joint Defense Treaty between Egypt and Syria from Novem-
ber 1966, it termed “an attack on either party an attack on the other.”6 Moreover, it is 
possible to deduce from the Egyptian inaction when the Israeli Air Force shot down six 
Syrian airplanes on April 7, 1967, that border incidents and small scale battles would 
not activate the pact. In the second place, there was nothing novel about the Egyptian-
Syrian-Jordanian pact because it was basically a re-activation of another defense treaty 
from 1950, the “Arab Collective Security pact” or the “Joint Defense and Economic 
Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League.” This treaty referred to 
Article 51 of the UN Charter as its juridical basis and stipulated in Article 2 that “�t�he 
Contracting  States consider any �act of� armed aggression made against any one or 
more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all.” According to point 
5 of the Military Annex to the Treaty, “the supreme command of the joint forces shall 
be entrusted to the Contracting State possessing the largest military force taking actual 
part in field operations.”7 Thus, the provision of Article 7 of the May 1967 pact that 
“in the event of military operations starting, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of 
the United Arab Republic shall assume command of operations in both states”8 is in 
line with the stipulation of the 1950 Agreement.9 In the third place, inter-Arab rela-
tions were far from manifesting any signs of cooperation and coordination, which was, 
2. Safran,  Israel: The Embattled Ally, p. 242.
. popp, “Stumbling Decidedly into the Six Day War,” p. 00.          
4. Abba Eban,   An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 25.
5. According to a CIA appraisal declassified recently, “UAR military dispositions in Sinai �were�              
defensive in character” (quoted in popp, “Stumbling Decidedly into the Six Day War,” p. 00, see 
also p. 02).
6. Brecher,  Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, p. 45.
7. Robert W. Macdonald,    The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Or-
ganisation (princeton: princeton University press, 1965), pp. 227 and 19-.
8. Quoted in Brecher,    Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, p. 412.
9. It may be added here that an “increasing coordination of military planning and command               
between Egypt, Syria and Jordan” (Handel, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” p. 115) 
also characterized the period immediately preceding the 1956 Suez War, without this having any im-
pact on the development of the war once it started.
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according to both Nasser and Israeli military leaders, a prerequisite for the Arab states 
launching an attack on Israel.40 Conflict was the order of the day. Approximately four 
weeks before the signing of the Treaty, Nasser accused King Husayn of Jordan of being 
“a CIA agent.” Moreover, Jordan broke off diplomatic relations with Syria on May 24, 
after a guerrilla attack inspired by the latter, and hastily re-established them on June 1. 
Syria was against the inclusion of Jordan into the pact,41 tended to ignore its commit-
ments under the Joint Defense Treaty, and refused to coordinate its policies with Egypt. 
In general terms, Egyptian-Syrian relations were far from being without substantial 
friction.42 Thus, the Treaty was more or less a faint policy declaration rather than a 
robust framework for war preparations.4 
 Thirdly, the super powers were able to intervene in order to restrain their allies. 
On at least two occasions, first on May 2, and then, together with the Soviet Union on 
May 26, the United States intervened to stop Israel from launching a first strike.44 After 
the war, the crucial role played by such interventions in postponing the Israeli action 
was confirmed by Israeli prime Minister Levi Eshkol: 
Had we not received Johnson’s letter and Rusk’s message, I would have urged the 
government to make the decision to fight; but their communications pointed out 
not only that unilateral Israeli action would be catastrophic but also that the United 
States was continuing with its preparations for multilateral action to open the gulf 
to shipping of all nations.45
French president Charles de gaulle also warned the Israelis against starting hostili-
ties.46 On the other hand, according to Oren, who presents the only account in the 
literature which mentions an Egyptian decision to attack Israel,47 the Soviet Union 
40. Brecher, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” p. 126; Safran,            Israel: The Embat-
tled Ally, p. 97.
41. Rodinson,  Israel and the Arabs, pp. 180 and 178.
42. See Walter Laqueur,    The Road to War, 1967: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), pp. 62-6 and Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 162, 47, and 177.
4. However, it may be argued that the joining of Jordan and Iraq to the Treaty, together with the                   
exaltation of the Arab public in the aftermath of the closure of the Strait with frequent calls for the 
destruction of Israel, may have aggravated the feeling of panic that was prevailing among the Israeli 
public. Although it may be seen as counter-intuitive, this factor does not have any immediate implica-
tions for the issue of whether the Israeli strike on June 5 was a pre-emptive one, simply because such 
decisions are taken not by the public but by the decision-maker at the top of the political hierarchy. 
However, as the Israeli government was divided over the issue of starting the war, these factors, op-
erating together with the changing stance of the United States’ position, may have had the effect of 
strengthening the case of those members of the top leadership who were proponents of an immediate 
strike, such as Defense Minister Moshe Dayan at the expense of “pacifists” such as prime Minister 
Eshkol and Foreign Minister Eban (Cf. Rodinson, Israel and the Arabs, pp. 179-180).
44. Eban,  An Autobiography, p. 4 and Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 102 and 12-124.
45. Eshkol quoted in Brecher,     Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, p. 401.
46. Eban,  An Autobiography, pp. 41 and 44.
47. For a substantial and convincing criticism of Oren’s argument see popp, “Stumbling Decidedly              
into the Six Day War,” pp. 295-8. According to popp “�t�aking the ‘Arab threat’ of May 25 seriously, 
is not only a departure from previous research but also from the accounts of some of the personal 
witnesses” (p. 297).
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exerted similar pressure on Egypt.48 Thus, during the last week of May, the war had 
been avoided, in the words of Oren, “�b�y the thinnest margins … the crisis appeared 
to have crested. To varying degrees, both sides had committed themselves to explore 
nonviolent solutions.”49 
Fourth, the strategic deception resorted to by Israel during the days immediately 
before the first strike may have further mitigated the crisis. During the last week of 
May, Israel demobilized 0,000 nonessential reservists. It is not unambiguously clear 
if this measure was just a stratagem or if it was taken for the purposes of reducing the 
economic costs of total mobilization. In any case, as it has been pointed out by an ob-
server, “�t�his may have caused Soviet and Arab intelligence organizations to conclude 
that Israel was not planning on war.”50 Another deceptive maneuver came just 48 hours 
before the Israeli strike. During a press conference on June , Israeli Defense Minister 
Moshe Dayan stated that “�i�t is too late for a spontaneous military reaction to Egypt’s 
blockade of the Tiran Straits … and still too early to learn any conclusion of the pos-
sible outcome of diplomatic action. The government … embarked on diplomacy and 
we must give it a chance.”51 In his autobiography, Dayan writes that “�a�t the press 
conference … �w�ithout being explicit, I was hoping that … the impression might be 
gained that we were not about to go to war but were intent on exhausting all the diplo-
matic possibilities.”52 The last known Israeli deception took place just one day before 
the first strike. After the Israeli government meeting in which the decision to go to war 
was taken, the Israeli government decided to add to the communiqué that Ambassador 
Avraham Harman was going to return to Washington “to continue diplomatic efforts.”5 
In the words of Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, the government communiqué 
“which was literally true, though not comprehensively accurate, sent many unpercep-
tive foreign correspondents back to their countries in despair of ever seeing a war.”54
In sum, these factors mitigated the crisis which erupted in mid-May. Seen from 
a certain perspective, the situation on the ground was a “return to a status quo ante 
1956”55 and Nasser did not seem to be in need of any further steps that would only ag-
gravate the crisis and jeopardize his gains.
As regards to the second element of the necessary condition, high levels of alert, 
it is possible to note that the armed forces of both Israel and Egypt were in high alert 
just before the start of hostilities on June 5. The alert levels of the Egyptian forces were 
at the maximum at the beginning of the crisis,56 but may have eased later as a result 
of the decrease in the intensity of the crisis. In the words of Oren, “�t�hough blackouts 
and air raid drills continued to be conducted, hospital beds reserved and military youth 
48. Oren,  Six Days of War, pp. 119-120.
49. Oren,  Six Days of War, p. 124.
50. Barton Whaley referred to in Handel, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” pp.               
11-12.
51. Dayan quoted in Handel, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” p.12. See also pp.                
15-16.
52. Moshe Dayan,   Story of My Life (New York: Da Capo press, 1976), p. 41.
5. Eban,  An Autobiography, p. 402.
54. Eban,  An Autobiography, p. 402.
55. Eban,  An Autobiography, p. 170. See also Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, p. 
411.
56. Safran,  Israel: The Embattled Ally, p. 81.
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clubs formed, Egypt’s mood was steadily returning to normal. Emergency regulations 
were eased along with restrictions on internal travel. Even tourism appeared to be up.”57 
The Israeli forces, in turn, were ready for war after two tactical decisions of the Israeli 
government: a partial mobilization order on May 16 and a total mobilization order on 
May 19.58 While Egypt deployed its fighter and attack planes to advanced positions 
on the Sinai peninsula and the northern parts of the country, Israel did not take — and 
probably because of its limited territory did not need to take — similar measures.
strAtegIc PArIty
Two features of the military balance between Israel and neighboring Arab states 
render a comparison of their military capabilities a difficult task. Firstly, the war ma-
chines of both sides were equipped with conventional weapons. In contrast to a nuclear 
military balance, which is contingent on the enormous destructive power of nuclear 
weapons, a conventional military balance is dependent on a set of factors, such as the 
respective modernity of different weapon systems, the human element, mobility, and 
capacity to mobilize rapidly, which are often difficult to measure. In this context, the 
speculations about Israel’s nuclear arsenal are irrelevant due to the fact that Israel never 
acknowledged its possession of nuclear weapons and, as a result of this, it never became 
a “nuclear power,” capable of formulating explicit military doctrines and strategies that 
incorporate the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, Israel probably decided to produce 
nuclear weapons after the Six Day War, although the country had such capacity long 
before.59 Secondly, the Arab-Israeli balance of power was characterized by a lack of 
asymmetry. During the two decades of arms race that preceded the June 1967 War nei-
ther Israel nor its Arab neighbors were able to establish an unambiguous superiority.60 
given the difficulties involved in analyzing a military balance that is both conventional 
and symmetric, it will be presumed here that such a balance is the outcome of an in-
teraction between three factors: (i) the quantitative dimension that refers to numbers of 
troops, tanks, warplanes, etc.; (ii) the qualitative dimension that concerns the effective-
ness and modernity of different weapon systems; and (iii) the human element which is 
related to features such as leadership, motivation, training, organization, etc.
As regards to the quantitative dimension, Arab states, which were parties to the 
Defense Treaty, had a clear superiority over Israel. At the time of the outbreak of hos-
tilities, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq had 410,000 troops, 2,200 tanks, and 810 war-
planes. Israel in turn had 264,000 soldiers (including the reserves), 800 tanks, and 50 
warplanes.61 According to another source, Israel was outnumbered 1. to 1 in overall 
manpower, 2.4 to 1 in aircraft, 2. to 1 in tanks, and 4.8 to 1 in artillery pieces.62
57. Oren,  Six Days of War, p. 159.
58. Brecher,  Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, pp. 18-19.
59. peter pry,   Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder: Westview press, 1984), p. 19.
60. It has to be pointed out that this view about Arab-Israeli parity is put in a new light by a recently                      
declassified CIA memo which claims that Israel had clear military superiority in numerical terms be-
fore the initiation of hostilities (see popp, “Stumbling Decidedly into the Six Day War,” p. 299). 
61. Daniel Dishon, ed.,    Middle East Record volume Three (Tel Aviv University, 1967), p. 205.
62. Reiter and Stam,    Democracies at War, p. 16. See also Oren, Six Days of War, p. 164. The 
estimates of a recently declassified CIA memo contradict these figures. According to this document, 
[Continued on next page]
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As far as the qualitative dimension of the military balance is concerned the fight-
ers and attack planes possessed by these states, which were regarded as modern by the 
mid-1960s, were as follows: the Soviet Mig-21 and Su-7, the French Mirage  C and 
Super-Mystère, and American A-4E Skyhawk. All these warplanes conducted their pre-
mier flights in the mid-50s6 and, thus, may be regarded as equally modern. The Israeli 
Air Force possessed 48 A-4E Skyhawk, 65 Mirage  C, and 12 Super-Mystère. The 
equivalent numbers for the Egyptian Air Force were 100 Mig-21 and 90 Su-7, for the 
Syrian Air Force 55 Mig-21 and 20 Su-7, and for the Iraqi Air Force 60 Mig-21 and 
20 Su-7.64 Other types of planes that were at the disposal of these states (Tu-16, Il-28, 
Mig-15, Mig-17, Mig-19, Vautour, Hunter, Mystère 4 A, and Magister) were more or 
less outdated by the mid-60s. Consequently, Israel had 125 modern aircraft compared 
to 45 possessed by the neighboring Arab states (including Iraq). However, this com-
parison should be taken cautiously as it says nothing about the effectiveness of the air 
forces of the states involved in the conflict or their capacity to use sophisticated, mod-
ern technology. Nor is it the case that modern aircraft produced during the same time 
period were equally advanced. Such considerations may explain why the outcome of 
the dogfights on April 7, 1967, when Israeli fighters shot down six Syrian Mig planes 
without suffering a single casualty was interpreted in France as demonstrating the su-
periority of the French-built Israeli Mirage over the Mig.65 Moreover, the advanced 
technology was not necessarily an advantage for the Arab side. According to Laqueur, 
the Arab soldiers had difficulties in handling certain “prestige weapons” which often 
turned out to be unsuitable for desert conditions.66 
With regard to the human element involved in the military balance, it is argued 
that there was “a qualitative gap in manpower” to Israel’s advantage67 and that the 
Israeli army was much stronger than its adversaries in terms of training, skills, and mo-
tivation68 in addition to morale and maintenance.69 Both Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak 
Rabin and the experts from the pentagon were convinced about the superiority of the 
Israeli Air Force over its Arab counterparts.70 In light of the quantitative comparison 
conducted above, this may be explained with reference to the Israeli pilots who were 
“better trained than their Egyptian adversaries, had more flying time, and almost all 
[Continued from previous page] 
the Israeli side had a slight superiority in terms of “operationally assigned fighter aircraft.” It had 256 
planes while the Arab side had only 222. Furthermore, only 117,000 Arab soldiers were close to the 
Israeli borders while Israel had 280,000 soldiers after successfully completing its military mobiliza-
tion (see popp, “Stumbling Decidedly into the Six Day War,” pp. 299 and 04). 
6. Cf. Christopher Chant,    Encyclopedia of World Aircraft (BDD promotional Book Co., 1990), 
pp. 9, 115, 228, and 11.
64. Jane’s Weapon Systems 1969-1970. It is not clear how many Iraqi aircraft were involved in the 
hostilities but according to Brecher, 2 Iraqi planes were destroyed during the war (Brecher, Deci-
sions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, p. 42).
65. Eban,  An Autobiography, p. 17.
66. Laqueur,  The Road to War, 1967, p. 69.
67. Shiff quoted in Brecher,     Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, p. 24.
68. Brecher,  Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, p. 24.
69. Robert J. Donovan,    Six Days in June: Israel’s Fight for Survival (New York: Signet Books, 
1967), p. 5.
70. Brecher,  Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, pp. 5-6 and 90.
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of their ... planes ... were operational.”71 Moreover, during the period before the June 
1967 War the Egyptian army was involved in an attrition war in Yemen and suffered 
from cutbacks in the defense budget, which was reflected in poor maintenance of its 
aircraft and a cessation of almost all training exercises. Furthermore, commanders in 
senior positions were appointed on the basis of familial ties and political loyalties rath-
er than competence.72 These factors may have had a negative impact on the morale of 
the Egyptian army personnel.
In sum, it is possible to claim that by the mid-1960s, there seemed to be an ap-
proximate military parity, based on a rather stable balance of military capabilities, be-
tween Israel and its Arab neighbors. Such a conclusion is deduced from the premise 
that qualitative and quantitative dimensions in a military balance, to a certain extent, 
can compensate for each other. In the Middle Eastern theater, the Arab supremacy in 
numbers was counterbalanced to a large extent by the superior training of the Israeli 
armed forces.7 
offensIve WeAPons And vulnerAbIlIty
It is clear from the analysis conducted in the preceding section that both sides 
of the conflict possessed offensive weapons in the form of warplanes. However, as far 
as the vulnerability of these weapons is concerned, the picture was very different. The 
outcome of the Israeli first attack on June 5 proved unambiguously the vulnerability 
of the Arab aircraft deployed in advanced positions. During the three waves of attacks 
conducted by the Israeli Air Force, Egypt lost 04 of its 419 warplanes, the Jordanian 
Air Force all, and the Syrian Air Force half of its aircraft on the ground.74 This was a 
repetition, on a larger scale, of what had happened during the Suez War in 1956, when 
the British and the French Air Forces destroyed the Egyptian warplanes on the ground. 
While Egypt apparently did not take any measures to reduce the vulnerability of its 
airplanes, which led to the 1967 debacle, Israel seemed to have drawn the correct les-
sons from the 1956 war, and began to build concrete underground shelters for all of its 
fighter aircraft.75 It is possible to envisage that this building project was completed by 
the mid-1960s and that the Israeli warplanes were well-protected at the outset of the 
crisis that preceded the June 1967 War. Moreover, Israeli air space was also generally 
impenetrable for Arab aircraft. A couple of days before the start of hostilities, chief mil-
itary spokesman Chaim Herzog, “having made a detailed estimate of the Arab forces in 
the region, discounted the possibilities of a successful blitz and strongly doubted that 
the Egyptians could penetrate Israel’s air defenses at all.”76 The situation on the Arab 
71. Oren,  Six Days of War, p. 171.
72. Oren,  Six Days of War, pp. 7 and 55-56.
7. Cf. Brecher,   Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, p. 1.
74. Handel, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” p. 14. For the vulnerability of the                
Egyptian aircraft see also Oren, Six Days of War, p. 171.
75. Handel,  Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars, p. 122. See also popp, “Stumbling 
Decidedly into the Six Day War,” p. 299.
76. Herzog referred to in Eban,      An Autobiography, p. 9. However, this claim is weakened by the 
fact that Egyptian Mig planes were able to conduct a couple of successful reconnaissance flights over 
the Dimona nuclear reactor at the beginning of the crisis.
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side was completely different. By December 1966, Israeli aircraft were penetrating 
Egyptian airspace up to the Suez Channel on a daily basis and had flown over Cairo on 
several occasions.77
It has to be noted in this context that despite these factors, Israel was militarily 
vulnerable to a certain extent because of its disadvantageous geographic situation. The 
northern and southern sections of the country were connected by a narrow strip which 
was only 12 kilometers in some sections. As a result of this, all of Israel’s air bases, 
with one exception, were within the range of Arab artillery.78 However, to judge from 
the military operations conducted by Israel during the Six Day War, this vulnerability 
does not seem to have played a significant role in Israeli war plans. On the Jordanian 
front the field operations were conducted in three sections: East Jerusalem, Latrun, and 
Jenin. It is clear from the description given by Safran79 that only the operations in the 
Jenin section were aimed at reducing the impact of this geographic vulnerability by 
placing the Jazreel Valley with its settlements and the important Ramat David air base 
outside of the range of Arab artillery. In the Jordanian front, in the words of Defense 
Minister Dayan, “the focal point, geographic and political, was of course Jerusalem,”80 
which was actually nearly surrounded by  Jordanian territory and whose western Israeli 
part was connected to the rest of Israel by a narrow corridor. The form and the target of 
the military operations indicate that the Israeli decision-makers did not regard the vul-
nerability of the air bases to Arab artillery as a serious threat or a grave danger which 
had to be eliminated at the outset of hostilities.
Thus, with the exception of Israeli geographic vulnerability, which does not seem 
to have influenced the Israeli war plans on a tactical level, the vulnerability of the Arab 
airplanes (offensive weapons) may be contrasted with the absence of such vulnerability 
on the part of the Israeli aircraft.
THE SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR A PRE-EMPTIvE WAR AND 
THE SIx DAY WAR
As far as the Israeli decision to launch a first strike on June 5, 1967 is concerned, 
there is a substantial amount of evidence in the literature which suggests that other 
types of calculations than perceived levels of military threat or anticipation of a mili-
tary attack by Arab states were pivotal in the Israeli decision-making process. This 
evidence, which is related to the sufficient conditions, may be summarized as follows.
First, during the period preceding the war, there was an ongoing power struggle 
within the Israeli decision-making apparatus between pacifists, such as Eshkol and 
Eban, and “activists,” most pre-eminent among them Dayan, over the issue of launch-
ing an attack.81 At a minimum this would imply the existence of a dispute among the 
Israeli decision-makers over whether or not an attack on the part of Arab states was im-
77. popp, “Stumbling Decidedly into the Six Day War,” p. 08.          
78. Safran,  Israel: The Embattled Ally, p. 240.
79. Safran,  Israel: The Embattled Ally, p. 248.
80. Dayan,  Story of My Life, pp. 66-67.
81. See Rodinson,   Israel and the Arabs, pp. 179-180 and William B. Quandt, “Lyndon Johnson 
and the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 
1992), pp. 215-220.
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minent. Such a dispute, in turn, would indicate the absence of unambiguous intelligence 
reports about such an imminent attack that would presumably put an end to the dispute. 
Second, at the height of the crisis, the Israeli government decided that preparations 
should be made to occupy the gaza Strip as a bargaining chip for reopening the Strait 
of Tiran — the so-called Operation Atzmon.82 The suggestion of such a limited military 
operation is not compatible with the perception of a large scale Arab military attack 
that is imminent and that would prompt a pre-emptive strike. Third, while the United 
States was intervening to restrain Israel, the latter was mounting sustained diplomatic 
efforts to acquire security commitments, or at least a green light to act alone, from the 
Johnson Administration.8 During the first week of June, the stance of the United States 
changed, and, in Quandt’s succinct formulation, “the red light turned yellow — but 
not quite green” and  “�f�or the Israeli cabinet, that was enough.”84 This would place 
the main determinant of the first strike elsewhere than the degree of perceived military 
threat. Fourth, there is circumstantial evidence in the literature which indicates that the 
main concern of the Israeli decision-makers was the long-term collapse of the Israeli 
deterrence.85 If true, this would support the view that the June 1967 War was a preven-
tive war rather than a pre-emptive one. The differences here are by no means merely 
terminological. Not only is it the case that a preventive war is “based on a concern over 
an historical shift in the military balance”86 which is fundamentally different from the 
emergency involved in an intense crisis situation characterized by high alert levels and 
mutual fears of imminent attack, but a preventive war is also illegal according to the 
mainstream opinion within international law.87 In sum, more and more evidence is ac-
cumulating in the literature, giving effect to the view that the Six Day War was a “war 
of choice” for Israel rather than being a pre-emptive war imposed upon Israel.88
CONCLUSIONS
It is not possible to give a definitive answer to the question of whether the Six 
Day War was a pre-emptive war, as long as documents related to the sufficient condition 
— such as the protocols of the Israeli Cabinet meetings before the start of the hostili-
ties — remain classified. It is true that an increasing amount of evidence indicates that 
the June 1967 War was anything but a military pre-emption, but the decisive piece of 
evidence is still missing. In the absence of this kind of primary data, the answer to the 
question can only be given tentatively and on the basis of an analysis of the existence 
or not of the necessary conditions for a pre-emptive first strike during the days preced-
82. Oren,  Six Days of War, p. 90.
8. Oren,  Six Days of War, pp. 19, 146, 147, 152-15 and passim.
84. Quandt, “Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?” p. 228.               
85. See Yariv, Eban, Dayan, and Sharon referred to in Oren,           Six Days of War, pp. 87, 89, 149 and 
14. This conclusion can be drawn especially from Rabin’s memoirs (see the references to it in Han-
del, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” pp. 127, 129-10 and 11); see also Eban, An 
Autobiography, p. .
86. Freedman,  The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 126.
87. Cf. Dinstein,   War, Aggression and Self-Defence, p. 172 and Malcolm N. Shaw, International 
Law, 4th Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1997), p. 790.
88. This, for instance, is the main conclusion of a recent article by popp (see popp, “Stumbling                 
Decidedly into the Six Day War.”)
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ing the Israeli first strike on June 5, 1967. As the preceding analysis indicates, several 
of these conditions — vulnerability of offensive weapons and the acute character of 
the crisis — were absent in the case of the June 1967 War, which raises strong doubts 
about the pre-emptive nature of this war.89 As indicated in the preceding section, this 
tentative conclusion also is supported by circumstantial evidence related to the suf-
ficient condition. 
Seen in this vein, the Six Day War is probably the first important instance where 
the meaning of the concept of pre-emptive war has been widened, in such a way as to 
comprise much more than what Webster and the scholars of nuclear strategic thinking 
had in mind. In some cases, the broadening of the concept has been the outcome of de-
liberate theoretical attempts, such as when Walzer draws “�t�he line between legitimate 
and illegitimate first strikes” not “at the point of imminent attack but at the point of 
sufficient threat”90 — a nightmare scenario for anyone concerned with the preservation 
of international stability. However, more often this usage is apparently unintentional 
as when the term “pre-emptive attack” is used in passing to refer to British and French 
military planning during the 1956 Suez War or Iraq’s first strike on Iran in 1980.91 And 
in a few instances the broadening of the concept may be due to political expediency as 
seems to be the case at the time of writing, with the war launched on Iraq by the USA 
and its allies.
In sum, given the methodological difficulties involved in determining whether a 
first strike is launched in the anticipation of an attack, there are compelling reasons not 
to widen the scope of the concept of pre-emptive war. This entails refraining from using 
the concept to refer to the Six Day War, and for that matter, any other conventional war 
in the absence of hard evidence that indicates the existence of the sufficient condition, 
that is, a decision taken with the knowledge of an imminent attack. This is especially 
important when account is taken of the fact that the concept, with its defensive connota-
tions, embraces a justification dimension — and actually refers to a legal action under 
international law — and that political convenience may dictate its use in circumstances 
that do not warrant such a use. 
 
89. Moreover, it was probably the non-pre-emptive nature of the June 1967 War which hindered               
Israel from launching a pre-emptive strike in October 197 when an attack was indeed imminent. See 
Handel, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” pp. 19-140.
90. Italics are mine. Walzer,     Just and Unjust Wars, p. 81.
91. Cf. Handel, “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars,” pp. 119 and 121; Dilip Hiro,                The 
Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict (London: paladin, 1990), pp. 40 and 48; and Efrahim Karsh, The 
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988  (Oxford: Osprey publishing, 2002), p. 27.
